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Abstract
This paper derives prior restrictions on the effects of changes in demand and
supply variables on the position of a bargaining contract curve. If an
estimated contract curve does not conform to these restrictions, it is
inconsistent with the underlying model. The paper also suggests a two st
a
methodology for estimating a contract curve.

Estimating a Bargaining Contract Curve: Prior Restrictions
and Methodology
by
Jan K. Brueckner
1 . Introduction
In the last several years, McDonald and Solow's (1981) efficient-bargain
model has attracted considerable attention in the collective bargaining
literature. Under this model, bargaining outcomes lie along a contract curve
comprised of tangencies between union and employer indifference curves in wage-
employment space. The efficient-bargain model has become the principal
alternative to the standard "demand-constrained" model of the bargaining
process, under which the union picks its preferred point on the employer's
demand curve for labor.
In a recent paper, Macurdy and Pencavel (1986) attempt to discriminate
empirically between the efficient-bargain and demand-constrained models. Theij
empirical results indicate that bargaining outcomes violate the tangency
condition associated with the demand constrained model, implying thai the
chosen point lies off the labor demand curve. This finding is interpreted as
evidence in favor of the efficient-bargain model. Eberts and Stone (191
attempt to discriminate between the two bargaining models by studying the
effect of employment increasing contract provisions. Such provisions would be
expected to reduce the wage in the demand-constrained model but could be
consistent with higher wages if bargaining outcomes lie along an upward sloping
contract curve. The empirical results, which show the hitter relationship,
favor the efficient-bargain model.
By contrast, Brown and Ashenfelter (1986) and Brueckner and O'Brien
(1988) attempt to estimate entire contract curves. Brown and Ashenfelter's
goal is to test for "strong efficiency," under winch employment depends on the
alternative wage but is insensitive to the contract wage. Brueckner and
O'Brien (1988), who focus on public sector bargaining, look for evidence of
bureaucratic self-interest in their estimated contract curve (self-interest is
manifested in the pursuit of excessive employment levels by government
bureaucrats )
.
In view of the growing popularity of the efficient-bargain model, it is
likely that some future papers will follow the latter studies by attempting to
estimate bargaining contract curves, Before such estimates can be used to
address hypotheses of Lnteresl (strong efficiency or bureaucratic self
interest, for example), researchers must offer evidence that their estimated
curves are consistent with the underlying bargaining model. It is well-known
that the ef
f
icient -barga in model imposes no restrictions on the slope of the
contrad curve unless preferences satisfy special assumptions. As a result,
both upward- and downward-sloping curves are consistent with the theory. Less
is known, however, about the effect on the contract curve of changes in the
demand and supply variables that underlie employer and union indifference maps
and help determine the curve's position. Examples of such variables are the
alternative wage (a supply variable) and community population in a public
sector model (a demand variable). To aid researchers in evaluating their
results, the present paper analyses the effects of demand and supply variables
on the position of the contract curve and states the minimal prior
restrici t ions that can be placed on these effects. While the restrictions are
fairly weak, Brueckner and O'Brien (1988) were able to reject the efficient
bargain model for several public employee samples by appealing to them.
Checking for violation of these rest r i c i t ions will allow future researchers to
decide whether their estimated contract curves are similarly inconsistent with
the efficient-bargain model.
The paper also suggests a two-stage approach to contract curve
estimation. The approach is based on the recognition that the point actually
reached on the contract curve depends on the bargaining strengths of the union
and employer. It is shown that an estimation method such as two -stage J east
squares is appropriate, with the full list of exogenous variables consisting of
the demand and supply variables along with variables measuring the bargain;
strengths of the two parties.
2. Prior Restrictions
To begin the analysis, it is assumed that union preferences over the wage
iv and employment L are represented by the utility function V(w,L,P), where /.'
a supply variable (a scalar rather- than vector variable is assumed for
simplicity). This function is assumed to be strictly quasi-concave in its
first two arguments, and an increase in p> is assumed to flatten indifference
curves in L-w space ( w is on the vertical axis). The marginal rate of
substitution V V is thus assumed to be a decreasing function of p. In the
L w
analysis, it will be convenient to invert, the equation V(w,L,P) v defining
indifference curve so that it reads w ^ h(L,p,v) (v is some constant utility
level). The function h satisfies h, = - V, /V < , h,
, (by quasi
I. L w LL
concavity), and h = 1/V > (the effect of p is discussed below).
v w
Without specifying the details of the institutional setting, the
employer's objective function is written U(w.L,a), where a is a (scalar) demand
variable. The labor demand curve used in th»> demand constrained bargainin
model is found by choosing /. to maximize U for fixed w, solving U. - , o) 0.
Under the assumption r < o, the second order cond I ion for 1
satisfied, and It follows that U is positive to the left and negative to the
right of the labor demand curve.
The employer's indifference curves are defined by U(w,L,a) = u for some
constant u, and the slope of an indifference curve equals -b\ /U . Given the
L w
behavior of UT and the fact that U is negative, it is easily seen that
indifference curves are upward-sloping to the left and downward-sloping to the
right of the labor demand curve. An increase in the demand variable is assumed
to increase the indifference curve slope [-VL/V is an increasing function of
1. w
a), so that a larger a makes the indi f ference curves steeper to the left and
flatter to the right of the demand curve. The higher a also moves the demand
curve to the right (note that after .it. Increase in a, U is positive along the
old demand curve). These changes are illustrated in Figure 1. As in the case
of the union indifference curves, it is convenient to invert the equation
U(w,L,a) = ii so that the employer- ' s indifference curves can be written a
g{L,a,u), where gT l\ /' and e \ U < (the effect of a will be
L L w u w
discussed be 1 ow)
.
Before presenting and analysing the equations that determine the contract
curve, further analysis of the functions h and g is needed. First, it
necessary to express the assumption that V
r
V is decreasing in ft in terms of
L. W
t lie function h. The assumption means that the absolute slope expression -h is
decreasing in ft provided that the utility level v adjusts to hold w constant as
ft changes. The adjustment in v restricts the focus to an indifference curve
passing through a particular il.,w) point, which by assumption becomes flatter.
Thus it must be the case that ( h ~ h [dv'd/i]) < 0, where dv/d/J is the
utility change required to keep w constant as ft increases. By differentiation
of w = h(L,ft.v), dv ilft equals h .,/)., so that the required condition is
Lft Lv ft v
(1)
By exactly analogous reasoning, the requirement that U /U is decreasing in a
means that the function g must satisfy
gT - gT g /g > G
.
( 2
)
sLa sLus cr su
Since normality conditions on preferences can be used to sign otherwise
ambiguous expressions in the analysis of the contract curve, statement of these
conditions in terms of the functions h and g is useful. For the union
indifference map, normality of L means that indifference curves become steeper
moving vertically in the L-w plane. Since a vertical movement corresponds to
an increase in v with L he-Id fixed, the appropriate condition is
h, < 0. (3)Lv
Similarly, normality of w means that indifference curves become flatter moving
horizontally. A horizontal movement corresponds to an increase In ' combined
with an increase in v that serves to keep w constant. The appropriate
condition is then h - h [dv di] > 0. where dv d A gives the hange
l_j L. Li V
in v. Since dv/d£ = /;, h , normality of w requires
!. v
h. - h h h > . ( 4
)
LL Lv L v
Although the employer's indifference map is unusual in thai the ut i
I
level is higher on lower indifference curves, I and <v w i 1 1 be viewed as
"normal" when the curves become flatter moving vertically and steeper moving
horizontally in the L-w plane. Since these properties are the reverse of those
exhibited by the union's indifference curves, repetition of the above argument
gives
*Lu <
°
*LL «Lu«L gu
< °
the conditions for normality of L and w respectively (note that g is
negative instead of positive since a vertical movement corresponds to .1
decrease rather than an increase in u) .
With the discussion of the h and g functions complete, the analysis of
ihf contract curve can now begin. The contract curve is defined by the
following system of simultaneous equations:
w = g(L,a, u)
w = h( L.ft. r)
gj ( I. n. 11) h
{
( I., ft. r)
(7)
(8)
(9)
Equations (7) and (8) indicate that employer and union indifference curves
intersect, and (9) says that the intersection involves a tangency. For this
tangency to represent a Pareto efficient bargaining outcome, it. must be the
case that g, , < h, , , so that the employer's indifference curve is less convex
~LL LL
t han t he un i on ' s .
The endogenous variables in the system (7)- (9) are w, /,, u. and v, and
since there are only three equations to solve for them, the system is
underdetermined . However, the contract curve is found by treating /, as fixed
and solving for the remaining variables. The resulting w solution, which can
be written
tv w( L, a, ft) 10)
is the equation of the contract curve. The goal of the analysis is to sign
the partial derivatives of the function in (10).
The derivative dw/dL gives the contract curve's slope. Treating L as
exogenous and totally differentiating the system (7) (9), this derivative is
given by
dw/dL = g + Whv ' gLu /gu
_
[gLL - gI.uVV 'Al - VA/V (n)
\v/hv - gW gn
The sign of (11) and thus the slope of the contract curve depends on whether L
and w are normal goods in the employer and union utility functions. If w is
normal in both cases, then the numerator of (11) is negative (recall (4) and
(6)). If L is normal in both cases, then the denominator is also negative
given that h > and g < (recall (3) and (5)). Normality of both goods
v u
therefore Implies that (11) is positive and that the contract curve is upwai
sloping. If on the other hand, w is inferior and L is normal for both the
employer and the union, then (4) and (6) are reversed. The numerator of (11!
then becomes positive, and the contract curve is downward sloping. Similarly,
if (v is normal but L is inferior, then (3) and (5) are reversed, the
denominator of (11) becomes positive, and the contract curve is again downward
sloping. Finally, if w (alternatively L) is neither normal nor inferior for
both the employer and union, implying that equality holds in (3) and (5) I
(4) and (6)), then the contract curve is vertical (horizontal). In all
admissible circumstances other than those just listed, the sign of (11) is
indeterminate and the contract curve could slope up or down.
Even though an explicit proof has not appeared in the Literature, the
above results are generally known. The effects of the demand and supply
variables a and (5 on the position of the contract curve are. however, less well
understood. The following analysis develops the minimal prior restrictions
that can be placed on these effects. Total differentiation of (7) (9) shows
that
dw/?.a = (12)
v Lu u
8 „/a/i= __M ia- /? v (13)
Lv v Lu \i
With the numerators of (12) and (13) positive by (1) and (2), the signs of the
expressions depend on the sign of the common denominator. From above,
normality of w implies that the denominator expression is negative. Under
se circumstances, cw/da is negative and dw/d/3 is positive, indicating that
the contract curve shifts down (up) as a ( p) increases. Note that this
statement holds regardless of whether the curve is upward or downward sloping.
In the reverse case where w is inferior for both the employer and. union, (12)
and (13) are respectively positive 1 and negative and the contract curve shifts
3
up (down) with an increase in a (/i).
Although the direction of demand and supply effects thus depends on
unobservable features of preferences, (12) and (13) do impose one mild
restriction on these effects. In particular, the contract curve's shift in
response to an increase in the demand variable must be in the opposit e
direction to the shift caused by an increase in the supply variable. If the
curve shifts down in response to an increase in a, then it must shift up in
response to an increase in ft, and vice versa. While this restricition is
useful in evaluating the consistency of empirical results, a stronger
restriction is in fact available in the case where the contract curve is upward
sloping. To derive the restriction, note that (12) and the first Line of (11)
together imply
dw/dL - g
L
=
— dw/da. (14)
p-
- (X pr /p-BLa ~Lu"nr u
Since the denominator of (14) is positive and g - h < must hold for the
Li Li Li J j
tangency point to be optimal, it follows that
sgn[dw. 3a] = -sgn[dw/dL - g ]. (15)
Since dw/da and dw/dp must have opposite signs, it also must be true th.it
sgn[3w :p) = sgn[3w/3I - g. ] . (16)
T<j interpret (15) and (16), note that the right-hand side depends on the
difference between the slope of the contract curve and the (negative) slope of
4
the indifference curves at the tangency point. While this difference can have
either sign when the contract curve is downward sloping, the difference must in-
positive when the curve is flat or upward sloping. Therefore, in the flat and
upward-sloping cases. (15) and (16) imply that dw/da and dw/dp are respective
negative and positive. When the contract curve is downward sloping, this
result is preserved provided that the curve is flatter than the indifference
curves, in which case dw/dL > g . However, the reverse impacts occur when the
L*
contract curve is steeper than the indifference curves (in this case dw/da and
dw/dft are respectively positive and negative). These results, which do not
depend on any assumptions about preferences, are summarized as follows:
Proposition . When the contract curve is flat or upward sloping, an
increase in the demand variable shifts the curve down {dw/da < 0) and an
increase in the supply variable shifts it up (dw/dp > 0). These results
also apply in the downward -s loping case provided that the contract curve
is flatter than the indifference curves. The reverse impacts ( w la >
and dw/dp < 0) occur otherwise.
10
Note that while the proposition provides strong restrictions in the flat and
upward-sloping cases, the fact that Lnd i f ferenc^ curve slopes are unobservable
mi'. ins tti.it only the weak restriction discussed above is available in the
.lownward-sloping case. In this case, all that can be said is that demand- and
supply - induced shifts in the contract curve must be in opposite directions. As
a final point, note that the proposition can be restated in terms of the
iression h, h - gr /g in the denominator of (12) and (13). Recalling thaiLv v I u u
the numerator of (12) is positive, the proposition implies that hr ,h - g; /gLv v Lu u
< (>) holds as dw/dL > (<) g
The proposition is illustrated in Figures 2 and 3, which show the effect
of an increase in the demand variable (recall that t-his flattens the employer's
indifference curves). Figure 2 illustrates the downward shift of an upward-
sloping contract curve, case A in Figure shows the same outcome in the case of
a relatively flat downward-sloping curve, and case B shows the upward shift of
a steep downward sloping curve. Note that casus A and B are based on differenl
union indifference maps.
Using the prior restrictions from the proposition, Brueckner and O'Brien
(1988) rejected the efficient bargain model for three national cross-section
samples of fire, police, and sanitation workers. Table 1 shows estimated log-
linear contract curves for the three samples. These equations were estimated
by two-stage least squares, as explained further in the next section of the
paper. The main demand variables in the equations are community population
(POP), population density (POPOEN), median income (INC), and the percentages of
the population nonwhite (NONWHT) and holding a high-school degree (HSDEG).
Supply variables are the alternative wage (taken to be the county manufacturing
wage, MFGW) and the state unemployment rate (UNEMP) . The percentage of
municipal revenue from outside sources (IGOVREV) is included to control- for
grant-induced variation in the effective price of public services, and median
house value (MEDVAL) captures demand differences in high and low cost-of-living
areas. The community-competition variable COMP , which equals the number of
municipalities in the county containing the given community, is included *"o
test for the self-interested behavior on the part of government bureaucrats
engaged in the collective bargaining process. Heightened community competition
is expected to restrain the pursuit of self-interest, reducing the bureaui ra1
demand for labor.
Since the significantly negative L coefficients in Table 1 in that
the est i m.it I'd contract curves are downward sloping, demand and supp 1
are indeterminate but must be of opposite sign. This restriction is violated,
however, by the estimated coefficients for POP (arguably the most impi
demand variable) and MFGW (a key supply variable). As can be seen in I a . ' 1.
all the POP and MFGW coefficients are positive and all except for th<
sanitation MTGW coefficient are signficant. Thus, Instead of shifting the
contract curve in opposite direct ions, increases in these demand and supply
variables yield identical upward shifts in the curve. With the efficiei t
bargain model rejected on the basis of those results, Brueckner and O'Brien
(1983) pursued an alternative approach based on the demand-constrained
bargaining model
.
Given their interest in supply effects, Brown and Ashenfelter (1986) d
not report demand variable coefficients for their newspaper- industry contra* '
curves. While this rules out complete evaluation of their results the el
of supply variables can bo checked against the prior- restrii tions. Paced with
alternative ways of measuring variables of interest, Brown and Ashenfelter
estimated a large number of equations with the same basic spei tl icat ion. In
their preferred regressions (the 22 equations in Tables 3C and 3E
paper), the performance of a key supply variable (one minus the unemployment
>'). is consistent with the restrictions implied by the proposition. This
variable's coefficient is consistently negative and significant, indicating
it a decrease in the unemployment rate shifts the contract curve to the left
(the curves are estimated with L as the dependent variable). This effect is
consistent with the proposition for those regressions where the contract, curve
is upward-sloping or vertical (the latter situation, which arises when the w
coefficient is not significantly different from zero, is an extreme version of
case B in Figure 3). A negative coefficient is also consistent with the
it ion for the downward sloping regressions, for which the predicted shifi
is indeterminate.
Results are less encouraging for the alternative wage, which has an
insignificant coefficient in the vast majority of Brown and Ashenfelter'
s
cases. While this outcome is unexpected, it constitutes a less serious
violation of the prior restrictions than the significantly positive MFGW
coefficients in Brueckner and O'Brien (1988). Given the poor performance of
the alternative wage variable, Brown and Ashenfelter rejected the hypothesis >'
"strong efficiency," under which employment depends on the alternative wage but
is insensitive to the contract wage.
3. Estimation Strategy
With derivation of the prior restrictions completed, the discussion now
considers the choice of a strategy for contract-curve est . imat ion. The key to
understanding the estimation problem is to note that since the system (7) -(9)
is underdetermined , more information is needed to find the point on the
contract curve that actually emerges from the bargaining process. A natural
way of providing the missing equation is to note that the bargaining outcome
will depend on the relative bargaining strengths of the union and employer.
Letting o" denote a vector of bargaining-strength variables, the system (7)-(9)
can be closed by adding the equation
u = f(6), (16)
which indicates that the employer's achieved utility level depends on the
values of the bargaining-strength variables.
To focus on the estimation issue, suppose that parts of the augmented
system consisting of (7)- (9) and (16) are stochastic. Suppose first that, the
tangency condition (9) holds with error, with e denoting the relevant error
term (the error could be additive or mull Lplical ive, depending on the
specification). The contract curve equation (10) will then involve e , so thai
w = w( I. , a, ft, c ) . Next, suppose that (1(S) holds with error, so that u
f{6,£
1
), where e is the relevant error term. Recognizing that ( 7 ) - ( 9 ) yield a
u solution that has the same functional dependence as the w solution (10). it
follows that a relationship of the form // = u{L,a, (i,& ) must also hold when (9)
is stochastic. Substituting this relationship into u f(o,c ) then yields the
equation u{L,a,ft,e ) = f(6,e ). This equation can be solved for L. giving L =
L{ a, /?, 6,e ,e ) . The reduced simultaneous system determining w and I. is thus
w = w(L,a.j3,s
Q ) |
17)
L = £(a./8.tf,e (JI "e 1 ).
(18)
The above system is recursive, suggesting that OLS estimation of (17) mighl be
permissible. However, this ignores the fact that a common stochastic element
appears in both equations. Since it is well known that. OLS estimation of a
recursive system with correlated errors leads to inconsistent estimates, an
instrumental variables approach to estimation of (17) is appropriate
Brueckner and O'Brien (1988) estimated the contract curves in Table 1 using
two-stage least squares, with the bargaining-strength variables 6 appearing
along with the demand and supply variables in the reduced form equation for L.
rhese bargaining-strength variables i tic 1 mind a dummy variable indicating the
form of the municipal government (city-manager governments were expected to be
tougher bargainers) and a variable? equal to the percentage of public employees
unionized in the state. Brown and Ashenfelter (1986) also used a two-stage
procedure, but they did not explicitly rely on the bargaining-strength approach
underlying (17) and (18).
To make the derivation of (17) and (18) more concrete, consider the
following example. Let the employer's indifference curves be Lineai over the
relevant range, so that (7) becomes w = u a(a)L, where the slope expression a
is a decreasing function of the demand variable. Then Let the union ul Llity
function be Cobb-Douglas, so that (8) is w = vL . where b is a decreasing
function of the supply variable. With s_ multiplicative, the stochastic
tangency condition becomes a( a) = e vb(/3)L Fin, illy, let o lie a scalar.
Q
with (Ifi) becoming u = £ 6 (c is a constant). Under these assumptions, log
versions of (17) and (18) are
log w = log a{a) - log b( ft) - log L - log £ (19)
log L = log b( ft) Log a(cr) + c log 6 + log co, (20)
where w is an error term given by
w e lb(ft) + c^
1
) (2 1 )
Since L is positively influenced by e by (20) and (21), it follows that I. is
negatively correlated with the error term in (19). This leads to inconsistent
OLS estimates, necessitating use of a procedure such as two-stage least
squares
.
To relate this example to the discussion of Section 2, note that the
contract curve in (19) is upward sloping, with the coefficient of log L
identically equal to one. In this case, the prior restrictions require that an
increase in a (/?) shifts the contract curve up (down). Recalling that the
functions a and b are both decreasing in their arguments, it is clear that (19)
satisfies these restrictions.
4. Conclusion
This paper has analysed the effects of demand and supply variables on the
position of the contract curve and developed prior restrictions on I
directions of these effects. Estimated contract curves must conform to the
restrictions to be consistent with the under-lying model. papei has also
suggested a two-stage methodology for contract curve estimation. If is hoped
that these contributions will prove useful to researchers engaged in empirical
implementation of the increasingly-popular efficient-bargain model.
Table 1
2SLS Contract Curve Estimates
from Brueckner and O'Brien (1988)
(Log-Linear Equations)
16
CONST
POP
POPDEN
INC
HSDEG
NONWHT
MEDVAL
IGOVREV
MPGW
UNEMP
CCMP
POLICE FIRE SANITATION
2.28 E+OO 3.41 E+00 -1.23 E+00
(2.74) (2.49) (-0.74)
-4.13 E-01 -4.46 E-01 -3.64 E-01
(-2.58) (-2.49) (-2.58)
4.83 E-01 5.14 E-01 3.30 E-01
(2.80) (2.84) (2.19)
5.84 E-02 1.15 E-01 2.69 E-01
(2.18) (4.29) (2.64)
-3.22 E-02 -2.62 E-01 2.36 E-01
(-0.32) (-1.56) (0.56)
4.48 E-02 -1.57 E-01 7.26 E-01
(0.66) (-1.69) (1.57)
1.88 E-02 -1.15 E-03 4.95 E-02
(1-25) (-0.08) (0.88)
1.20 E-01 2.02 E-01 -1.88 E-01
(2.42) (3.48) (-0.96)
-3.31 E-02 2.32 E-02 4.83 E-02
(-0.90) (0.56) (0.43)
4.51 E-01 4.33 E-01 4.32 E-01
(4.25) (3.88) (1.11)
1.16 E-01 3.70 E-02 1.44 E-01
(1.53) (0.47) (0.45)
4.31 E-02 1.77 E-02 3.28 E-02
(2.66) (0.85) (0.45)
Dependent variable is the wage; L is endogenous
t-ratios in parentheses
The sample sizes for the police, fire, and sanitation
equations are 310, 283, and 37 respectively.
wFigure 1.
The Effect of an Increase
in the Demand Variable
wFigure 2.
Shift of an Upward-Sloping
Contract Curve
wFigure 3.
Shifts of Downward-Sloping
Contract Curves
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at the University of Illinois. I thank Larry Kahn and Kangoh Lee for
comments. Errors, however, are mine.
Satisfaction of this condition is not guaranteed and must be assumed.
2
Alternatively, the equation could give L in terms of w. The choice of
dependent, variable is immaterial.
3Gyourko and Tracy (1983) derive a result analogous to the first of these
statements in the context of a specialized model. The result is never used,
however, since their empirical work is devoted to estimating reduced-form wage
and employment equations.
4
Recall that g = h at the tangency.
'Since this statement implies that h
r
h \ must be negative when the
[ \ 1 \7 1111
contract curve is upward sloping, it follows thai the numerator of the slope
expression (11) must also be negative in this case. The rase where both the
numerator and denominator of (11) are positive is thus ruled out (this would
lead to an upward-sloping contract curve with the wrong sign for h, /h
Lv v
Sr /g )• This case can also be ruled out from first principles sinceTill!
positivity of both terms in (11) can be shown to imply g > h in violation
of the condition for the optimality of the tangency point.'
p
Similar community competition variables have been used by other papers to test
for labor market monopsony effects. See Brueckner and O'Brien (1988) for a
discussion of the relationship between the two uses of these variables.
The approach involved estimation of a labor demand curve instead of a contract
curve. The right-hand variables in the demand regression included all the
variables in Table 1 with the exception of the supply variables MFGW and
UNEMP.
Q
Since u automatically determines v along the contract curve, v could just as
well have appeared on the left-hand side of (1(5). Note also that the function
f is not invariant to the scaling of the employer's utility function.
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